Winners Don't Punish by Fudenberg, Drew et al.
 
Winners Don't Punish
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Dreber, Anna, David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg, and Martin A.
Nowak.  Winners don't punish.  Nature 452: 335-348.
Published Version http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/files/winner
s don't punish.pdf
Accessed February 17, 2015 1:19:29 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2252594
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPWinners don’t punish 
 
Anna Dreber
1,2*, David G. Rand
1,3*, Drew Fudenberg
4 & Martin A. Nowak
1,5,6† 
1Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, 
3Department of Systems Biology, 
4Department of 
Economics, 
5Department of Mathematics, 
6Department of Organismic and Evolutionary 
Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. 
2Stockholm School 
of Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden. 
*These authors contributed equally to this work, 
†Corresponding author 
 
A key aspect of human behavior is cooperation
1-7. We tend to help others even if 
costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the 
benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between 
what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if 
everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently, there has 
been much interest to explore the effect of costly punishment on human 
cooperation
8-23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to 
incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation 
even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects
10. But 
most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if 
costly punishment plays an important role in promoting cooperation, it must do so 
in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments where in each round of a 
repeated game people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. 
In control experiments, people can only cooperate or defect. We find that the option 
of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation, but not the average 
payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between 
total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total 
payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don’t punish. This suggests that 
costly punishment behavior is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have 
evolved for other reasons. 
 
The essence of cooperation is described by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Two players have a 
choice between cooperation, C, and defection, D. If both players cooperate they get more 
than if both defect, but defecting against a cooperator leads to the highest payoff, while 
cooperating with a defector leads to the lowest payoff. One way to construct a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is by assuming that cooperation implies paying a cost for the other person to 
receive a benefit, while defection implies taking something away from the other person 
(Fig 1).  
 
Without any mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, natural selection favors 
defection. But a number of such mechanisms have been proposed, including direct and 
indirect reciprocity
 7.  Direct reciprocity means there are repeated encounters between the 
same two individuals, and my behavior depends on what you have done to me 
1-6. 
Indirect reciprocity means there are repeated encounters within a group; my behavior also 
depends on what you have done to others.  
Costly (or altruistic) punishment, P, means that one person pays a cost for another person 
to incur a cost. People are willing to use costly punishment against others who have 
  - 1 - defected
8-18. Costly punishment is not a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
7, but 
requires a mechanism for its evolution
19-23. Like the idea of reputation effects
24, costly 
punishment is a form of direct or indirect reciprocity. If I punish you because you have 
defected against me, direct reciprocity is used. If I punish you because you have defected 
with others, indirect reciprocity is at work. The concept of costly punishment suggests 
that the basic game should be extended from two possible behaviors (C and D) to three 
(C, D and P). Here we investigate the consequences of this extension for the repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 
104 subjects participated in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments at the Harvard 
Business School Computer Lab for Experimental Research. Participants interacted 
anonymously in pair-wise encounters via computer screens. Subjects did not know how 
long each interaction would last, but knew that the probability of another round was 0.75
 
(as in Ref. 25). In any given round, the subjects chose simultaneously between all 
available options, which were presented in a neutral language. After each round, the 
subjects were shown the other person’s choice as well as both payoff scores. At the end 
of the interaction, the participants were presented with the final scores and then randomly 
re-matched for another interaction.  
 
We have performed two control experiments (C1 and C2) and two treatments (T1 and 
T2). In the control experiments, people played a standard repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
In each round they could either cooperate or defect. Cooperation meant paying 1 unit for 
the other person to receive 2 units (in C1 and T1) or 3 units (in C2 and T2). Defection 
meant gaining 1 unit at a cost of 1 for the other person. In the treatments, people had 
three options in every round: cooperate, defect or punish. Punishment meant paying 1 
unit for the other person to lose 4. We used a 4:1 punishment technology because it has 
been shown to be more effective in promoting cooperation than other ratios
13. The 
resulting payoff matrices are shown in Figure 1. See Supplementary Information for more 
details.  
 
Figure 2 shows some examples of games that occurred in the treatments T1 and T2. A 
number of games were all-out cooperation. Sometimes cooperation could be maintained 
by forgiving an opponent’s defection. At other times, defection in response to defection 
was able to restore cooperation. Typically, costly punishment did not re-establish 
cooperation. In some cases, costly punishment provoked counter-punishment, thereby 
assuring mutual destruction. Giving people the option of costly punishment can also lead 
to unprovoked first strikes with disastrous consequences. 
 
Comparing the two control experiments, C1 and C2, we find that the frequency of 
cooperation increases as the benefit to cost ratio increases. In C1, 21.2% of decisions are 
cooperation, compared to 43.0% in C2. For both parameter choices, cooperation is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Comparing each control experiment with its corresponding 
treatment, we find that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation. In T1 and T2, 
52.4% and 59.7% of all decisions are cooperation. 
 
  - 2 - Punishment, however, does not increase the average payoff. In T1 and T2, we observe 
that 7.6% and 5.8% of decisions are punishment, P. We find no significant difference in 
the average payoff when comparing C1 with T1 and C2 with T2. Therefore, punishment 
has no benefit for the group, which makes it hard to argue that punishment might have 
evolved by group selection
22.  
 
Examining the data of experiments T1 and T2 on the individual level, we find no 
correlation between the use of cooperation or defection and payoff, but a strong negative 
correlation between the use of punishment and payoff (Fig 3). In experiment T1, the five 
top ranked players, who earned the highest total payoff, have never used costly 
punishment. In both experiments, the players who end up with the lowest payoff tend to 
punish most often. Hence, for maximizing the overall income it is best never to punish: 
winners don’t punish (Fig 3). 
 
It could be the case that the winners of our experiment were merely lucky in that they 
were paired with people against whom punishment was not necessary. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we analyzed the correlation between payoff and the first order conditional 
strategies used by people. Figure 4 illustrates a strong negative correlation between 
payoff and the probability to use punishment, P, after the opponent has defected, D. 
Winners tend to respond by using D against D, while losers use P against D. The 
response to another person’s defection is the only strategic feature which is clearly 
correlated with winning or losing the game. Winners play a tit-for-tat like strategy
2,4, 
while losers use costly punishment. 
 
It could be that using costly punishment becomes more beneficial as the game progresses. 
In order to test this possibility, we have separately analyzed the data from the last ¼ of all 
interactions. Again, it remains true that there is a strong negative correlation between an 
individual’s payoff and his use of costly punishment.  
 
In previous experiments, punishment was usually offered as a separate option following 
one or several rounds of a public goods game. The public goods game is a multi-person 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, where each player can invest a certain sum into a common pool, 
which is then multiplied by a factor and equally divided among all players irrespective of 
whether they have invested or not
 26.  After the public goods game, people are asked if 
they want to pay money for others to lose money. People are willing to use this option in 
order to punish those who have invested nothing or only very little, and the presence of 
this option has been found to increase contributions
8,10.  
 
Careful analysis, however, has revealed that in most cases, punishment does not increase 
the average payoff. In some experiments, punishment reduces the average payoff 
9,10,12,27, 
while in others it does not lead to a significant change
11,14,15. Only once has punishment 
been found to increase the average payoff 
13.  The higher frequency of cooperation is 
usually offset by the cost of punishment, which affects both the punisher and the 
punished. Our findings are in agreement with this observation: the option of costly 
punishment does not increase the average payoff of the group. It is possible, however, 
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the average payoff. 
 
It is sometimes argued that costly punishment is a mechanism for stabilizing cooperation 
in anonymous, one-shot games. But whether or not this is the case seems to be of little 
importance, because most of our interactions occur in a context where repetition is 
possible and reputation matters. For millions of years of human evolution, our ancestors 
have lived in relatively small groups where people knew each other. Interactions in such 
groups are certainly repeated and open ended. Thus, our strategic instincts have been 
evolving in situations where it is likely that others either directly observe my actions or 
eventually find out about them. Also in modern life, most of our interactions occur with 
people whom we meet frequently. Typically, we can never rule out ‘subsequent rounds’. 
Therefore, if costly punishment is important for the evolution of human cooperation, then 
it must play a beneficial role in the setting of repeated games. Our findings do not support 
this claim.  
 
We also believe that our current design has some additional advantages over previous 
ones. In our setting, costly punishment is always one of three options. Hence, there is an 
opportunity cost for using punishment, because the subject forfeits the opportunity to 
cooperate or to defect. Our design also minimizes the experimenter and participant 
demand effects
28, because there are always several options 
27. In many previous 
experiments retaliation for punishment is not possible 
9-16,27, but it is a natural feature of 
our setting. 
 
In summary, our data show that costly punishment strongly disfavors the individual who 
uses it and hence it is opposed by individual selection in cooperation games where direct 
reciprocity is possible. We conclude that costly punishment might have evolved for 
reasons other than promoting cooperation, such as coercing individuals into submission 
and establishing dominance hierarchies
20,29. Punishment might enable a group to exert 
control over individual behavior. A stronger individual could use punishment to dominate 
weaker ones. People engage in conflicts and know that conflicts can carry costs. Costly 
punishment serves to escalate conflicts, not to moderate them. Costly punishment might 
force people to submit, but not to cooperate. It could be that costly punishment is 
beneficial in these other games, but the use of costly punishment in games of cooperation 
appears to be maladaptive. We have shown that in the framework of direct reciprocity, 
winners do not use costly punishment, while losers punish and perish. 
 
Methods summary 
 
A total of 104 subjects (45 women, 59 men, mean age 22.2) from Boston area colleges 
and universities participated voluntarily in a modified repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
at the Harvard Business School Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER). The 
lab consists of 36 computers which are visually partitioned. The participants interacted 
anonymously via the software z-Tree
30. The subjects were from a number of different 
schools and a wide range of fields of study, such that it was unlikely for any subject to 
know more than one other person in the room. No significant difference in cooperation 
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economics majors and non-economic majors (Mann-Whitney test: p > 0.05 for all 
sessions). Subjects were not allowed to participate in more than one session of the 
experiment. A total of 4 sessions were conducted in April and May 2007, with an average 
of 26 participants playing an average of 24 interactions, for an average of 79 total rounds 
per subject. At the start of each new interaction, subjects were unaware of the previous 
decisions of the other player. After each round, the subjects were shown the other 
person's choice as well as both payoff scores. At the end of the interaction, the 
participants were presented with the final scores and then randomly re-matched for 
another interaction.  
 
In each session, the subjects were paid a $15 show up fee. Each subject’s final score 
summed over all interactions was multiplied by $0.10 to determine additional earned 
income. To allow for negative incomes while maintaining the $15 show up fee, $5 was 
added to each subject’s earned income at the end of the session. Subjects were informed 
of this extra $5 at the beginning of the session. The average payment per subject was $26 
and the average session length was 1.25 hours. 
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Figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1. Payoff values. A: The game is formulated in terms of unilateral moves. There 
is the choice between cooperation, C, defection, D, and costly punishment, P. 
Cooperation means paying a cost, c, for the other person to get a benefit, b. Defection 
means earning a payoff, d, at a cost, d, for the other person. Punishment means paying a 
cost, α, for the other person to incur a cost, β. B: The payoff matrix is constructed from 
these unilateral moves. C and D: The actual payoff matrices of our experiments.  
 
 
Figure 2. Games people played. There were 1230 pair-wise, repeated interactions each 
lasting between 1 and 9 rounds. Here are some examples (B, E and G are from T1, the 
others from T2.)  The two players’ moves, the cumulative payoff of that interaction and 
the final rank of each player (sorted from highest to lowest payoff) are shown. A: All-out 
cooperation between two top-ranked players. B: Punish and perish. C: Defection for 
defection can sometimes restore cooperation. D: Turning the other cheek can also restore 
cooperation. E: Mutual punishment is mutual destruction. F: Punishment does not restore 
cooperation. Player 1 punishes a defection, which leads to mutual defection. Then player 
1 is unsatisfied and deals out more punishment. G: “Guns don’t kill people, people kill 
people”. (Punishment itself is not destructive, only the people who use it.)  Here, an 
unprovoked first strike destroys cooperation. The option to punish allows irrational 
people to inflict harm on the undeserving.  
 
Figure 3. Punish and perish. In both treatments T1 (red) and T2 (blue), there is no 
correlation between average payoff per round and (i) cooperation use (Quantile 
regression; A, p = 0.33; B, p = 0.21) or (ii) defection use (C, p = 0.66; D, p = 0.36). 
However, there is a significant negative correlation between average payoff per round 
and punishment use in both treatments (E, slope = -0.042, p < 0.001; F, slope = -0.029, p 
= 0.015). Punishment use is the overriding determinant of payoff. G and H: Ranking 
players according to their total payoff shows a clear trend: players with lower rank 
(higher payoffs) punish less than players with higher rank (lower payoff).  
 
 
Figure 4. Tit-for-tat prevails over costly punishment. Lower payoffs are correlated not 
only with punishment use, but specifically with choosing to punish after the opponent has 
defected. The probability of punishing immediately after a co-player’s defection is 
negatively correlated with the average payoff per round, both in T1 and T2 (Quantile 
regression; A, slope = -0.81, p < 0.001; B, slope = -0.94, p = 0.015). Thus, the lower 
payoffs of punishers were not caused by the bad luck of interacting with defectors. 
Winners use a tit-for-tat like approach (D for D), while losers use costly punishment (P 
for D).  
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1. Supporting Figures and Data 
 
Figure S1 shows the payoff matrices for each experiment. In all four payoff matrices the 
strategy Grim – start playing C and play C unless D has been played in the past – is a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium with the specified continuation probability of ¾. 
 
C1 CD CDP C2 CD T2 CDP
C 1 -2 C 1 -2 -5 C 2 -2 C 2 -2 -5
D 3 0 D 30- 3 D 40 D 40- 3
P 1 -2 -5 P 2 -2 -5
T1
 
 
Figure S1. Payoff matrices for each experiment. The row player’s payoff is shown. Each game unit is 
worth $0.10. 
 
Each pairing of participants was drawn at random from the entire group. Therefore, not 
all interactions are independent, because some interactions share the same player. For this 
reason, we have not conducted our statistical analysis at the level of interactions (N 
between 293 and 324, depending on the session), but at the level of subjects (N between 
22 and 30, depending on the session). 
We have used quantile regression as opposed to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
in all of our correlation analyses. Quantile regression has been shown to perform better 
than ordinary least squares  (OLS) for data with non-Gaussian error distributions
1-3. 
Average payoff per decision is likely to have a non-Gaussian error distribution, as 
subjects using different strategies will presumably have payoffs centered around different 
values. Additionally, quantile regression is more robust than OLS to the presence of 
outliers
1-3. For both of these reasons, a quantile regression is more appropriate here than 
an ordinary least squares regression for our data. Nonetheless, OLS regression with 
robust standard error gives similar results to quantile regression for our data. Regressing 
  - 13 - average payoff per decision against punishment use is significant, and gives a similar 
slope to quantile regression (T1: slope coefficient = -0.038, p<0.001; T2: slope 
coefficient = -0.031, p<0.001). Regressing average payoff per decision against 
probability to punish in response to defection is significant in T1 (slope coefficient = -
.730, p<0.001), and significant in T2 (slope coefficient = -1.211, p=0.04) with the 
exclusion of one outlier, who has a probability to punish in response to defection more 
than 3 standard deviations greater than the mean. Quantile regression is less sensitive to 
outliers than OLS, and so does not necessitate the exclusion of any data.  
Our random partner-matching method does not prevent cyclic interactions, such as A 
playing with B, then B playing with C, and then A playing with C. To assess whether 
these cycles affect our conclusion, we have examined the effect of ignoring such 
interactions.  Excluding all interactions between A and C such that A played with B, then 
B played with C, and then A played with C (~55% of decisions in C1 and T1, and ~66% 
of interactions in C2 and T2), we still find a significant negative correlation between 
punishment use and average payoff per round (Quantile regression; T1 slope = -0.068, t = 
-2.95, p = 0.006; T2, slope = -0.086, t = -2.26, p = 0.034).  
 
 
As described in the main text, the option for costly punishment significantly increases the 
average cooperation frequency (Fisher’s Exact Test, two-tailed; C1 vs T1: p < 0.001; C2 
vs T2: p < 0.001), as shown in Fig. S2A. But the average payoff per round is not 
significantly different between each control and its corresponding treatment (Mann-
Whitney test; C1 vs T1: z = 1.043, p = 0.30; C2 vs T2: z = −0.231, p = 0.82), as shown in 
Fig. S2B. Therefore, punishment does not provide any advantage for the group. 
Additionally, the variance in payoffs is larger with punishment than without (C1, std = 
14.4; T1, std = 21.5; C2, std = 20.8; T2, std =25.0).  
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Figure S2. Cooperation frequency (A) and average payoff per round (B) in each session. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. There is significantly more cooperation in each treatment than in the 
corresponding control, but no significant difference in the average payoff.  All control and treatment 
payoffs are significantly lower than the optimally cooperative payoff for ALLC play. 
 
In our control experiment C1 (with a b/c ratio of 2), unprovoked defection increases over 
the course of the session (Quantile regression, unprovoked defections occurrence against 
interaction number; slope = 0.5, t = 5.06, p < 0.001). This means people ‘learn’ to defect. 
In the control experiment C2 (with a b/c ratio of 3), unprovoked defection decreases over 
the course of the session (Slope = -0.1875, t = -2.65, p = 0.014); hence, people ‘learn’ to 
cooperate. Interestingly, in both treatments, T1 and T2, there is no significant change of 
unprovoked defection over the course of the session (T1: t = 0, p = 1.00; T2: t = -1.12, p 
= 0.27). Hence, the threat of punishment seems to reduce unprovoked defection over time 
when comparing C1 with T1, but not when comparing C2 with T2. 
 
In the control treatments, the correlation between average payoff and cooperation use 
varies between sessions, as can be seen in Fig. S3. In C1, where the benefit-to-cost ratio 
is 2, a significant negative correlation exists between average payoff and cooperation use 
(Fig. S3A; Quantile regression; t = −2.61, p = 0.015, slope = −0.50).  In C2, where the 
benefit-to-cost ratio is 3, no such correlation exists (Fig. S3B; Quantile regression; t = 
0.77, p = 0.452).  
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Figure S3. In the control sessions, the benefit-to-cost ratio affects the correlation between cooperation use 
and average payoff. A: In C1, where the benefit-to-cost ratio is 2, there is a negative correlation between 
cooperation use and average payoff.  B: In C2, where the benefit-to-cost ratio is 3, no such correlation 
exists. 
 
In addition to the negative correlation between average payoff and punishment use, and 
between average payoff and probability to use punishment in response to defection, there 
is further evidence that punishment use is the main determinant of payoff in the 
treatments. As shown in Fig. S4, punishers get lower payoffs than non-punishers, despite 
being equally cooperative. There is no significant difference in the frequency of 
cooperation between punishers and non-punishers (Fig. S4A; Mann-Whitney test; T1, z = 
−0.392, p = 0.69; T2, z = 0.900, p = 0.37). Punishers have significantly lower average 
payoffs than non-punishers (Fig. S4B; Mann-Whitney test; T1, z = 3.262 p = 0.001; T2, z 
= 2.502, p = 0.012). Both of these results are robust to the inclusion of players who might 
have “trembled” and punished only once.  The fact that punishers are as cooperative as 
non-punishers refutes the possibility that the real difference driving payoffs is 
cooperation.  It could be thought that non-punishers got higher payoffs because they were 
defectors whereas the punishers were cooperators, but this is not the case.  This analysis 
further demonstrates that the key difference between high and low earners is the use of 
punishment. 
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Figure S4. Punishers get lower payoffs than non-punishers, despite being equally cooperative. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. A: There is no significant difference in the frequency of cooperation 
between punishers and non-punishers. B: Punishers have significantly lower payoffs than non-punishers. 
Both of these results are robust to the inclusion of players who might have “trembled” and punished only 
once.   
 
To assess the effect of experience, we have examined the last ¼ of interactions. In T1 
these are interactions 15-21. In T2 these are interactions 20-27.  In both treatments, there 
is still a strong negative correlation between average payoff and punishment use, when 
considering only the final ¼ of interactions (Quantile regression; T1: slope = -0.167, t = -
4.85, p<0.001; T2 slope = -0.170, t = -4.29, p<0.001). Therefore, we conclude that the 
benefits of punishment are not increasing with experience in our experiment. Even in the 
last ¼ of interactions, it is the case that winners don’t punish.   
 
In the traditional approach, the ‘punishment’ for non-cooperative behavior is defection
4-
10. Tit-for-tat, for example, cooperates when the co-player has cooperated and defects 
when the co-player has defected. The proposal of strong reciprocity
11-12 is to use costly 
punishment, P, instead of defection, D, in response to a co-player’s defection. Our data 
show that such behavior is maladaptive: winners use classical tit-for-tat like behavior 
5,7, 
while losers use costly punishment. 
 
Average move frequency as a function of round in the treatment sessions is show in Fig. 
S5. Cooperation use decreases over the course of an interaction, while defection use 
  - 17 - increases. Although this may appear to be an effect of players inappropriately 
anticipating the game’s end despite the constant probability of continuation each round, 
this is not necessarily the case. This same pattern could be explained by a constant 
probability to defect coupled with the tit-for-tat style response to defection.  
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Figure S5. Average frequency of cooperation (blue), defection (red), and punishment (yellow) over the 
course of an interaction, for sessions T1 (A) and T2 (B). As the number of rounds increases, cooperation 
decreases and defection increases. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. S6, punishment use is almost non-existent in the first round, as one 
would expect. In T1, punishment use increases over the course of an interaction. In T2, 
punishment use is essentially constant for rounds 2 to 6.  
 
The round in which punishment is first used in a given interaction is shown in Fig. S6. 
Consistent with Fig. S5, punishment is rare in the first round. The first use of punishment 
is most likely to occur in the second round. 
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Figure S6. Histogram of rounds in which punishment is first used. Most often, punishment is first used 
during round 2, in response to the action taken by the other player on round 1. 
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2. Experimental Instructions (for session T1) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. If you have any questions, please do 
not hesitate to ask us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed during the 
experiment. 
 
In this experiment about decision making, you have been randomly matched with another 
person in the room. Neither of you will ever know the identity of the other. Everyone will 
receive a fixed amount of $15 for participating in the experiment. In addition, you will be 
able to earn more money based on the decisions you make in the experiment. The fixed 
amount and the money that you earn will be paid to you in cash immediately after the 
experiment is over.  
 
You will interact several times with several different people.   Based on the choices 
made by you and the other participants over the course of these interactions, you will 
receive between $0 and $25, in addition to the $15 show-up amount. 
 
The Interaction: 
 
There are three possible options available to both you and the other person in every 
round of the experiment: A, B or C. Throughout the experiment, the person who 
makes a decision will consider him/herself as ‘You’ and consider the other person as 
‘The other person’. 
 
The payoffs of the options (in units) 
 
Option         You        The other person  
 will get    will get 
 
A:       −1        +2   
 
B:      +1        −1 
 
C:       −1        −4 
 
  - 20 - 1 unit = $0.10 
 
If you choose A then you will get −1 units, whereas the other person will get +2 units. 
 
If you choose B then you will get +1 units, whereas the other person will get −1 units. 
 
If you choose C then you will get −1 unit, whereas the other person will get −4 units. 
  - 21 - An experiment round is composed of two steps: 
 
Step 1: 
 
Both you and the other person begin by choosing one of these three options: A, B or 
C. There is a time limit on each decision. If you take more than 25 seconds a random 
choice will be picked for you, so it is very important that you not take longer than 25 
seconds. 
 
Step 2: 
 
You and the other person are presented with each other’s choice. Your score for 
round 1 will be calculated and presented to you on your computer screen. Your score in 
every round of the experiment is the sum of your payoff from your chosen option and of 
your payoff from the other person’s chosen option. Your score each round is thus 
determined by both your decision and the other person's decision, from step 1 and 
step 2. See the examples below for clarification. 
 
 
The number of rounds in an interaction is determined by a random mechanism. The 
probability that there will be another round is ¾. Therefore, each pair will interact 
another round with probability 3/4. 
 
Your behavior will have no effect on the number of rounds. Every round will follow the 
same pattern of two steps. The total scores will be calculated when the interaction is 
finished. Thereafter, you will be anonymously and randomly matched with another 
student  and will repeat the same task again. This change of person that you are 
interacting with will occur several times. 
 
The score (number of units) that you have at the end of these interactions will 
determine how much money you earned in total. Therefore, the additional money you 
and the other persons each earn depends on which options you both choose. However, 
the final scores of the other participants do not matter for your final score. 
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Examples: 
 
 
The payoffs of the options (in units) 
 
Option         You        The other person  
 will get    will get 
 
A:       −1        +2   
 
B:      +1        −1 
 
C:       −1        −4 
 
 
If you both choose A then each of you will get +1  
(-1 from yourself, +2 from the other = +1 total)  
 
If you both choose B then each of you will get 0  
(+1 from yourself, -1 from the other = 0 total) 
 
If you both choose C then each of you will get -5 
(-1 from yourself, -4 from the other = -5 total) 
 
If person 1 chooses A, and person 2 chooses B then person 1 gets –2 (-1 from person 1, 
-1 from person 2) and person 2 gets +3 (+2 from person 1, +1 from person 2). 
 
If person 1 chooses C, and person 2 chooses A then person 1 gets +1 (-1 from person 1, 
+2 from person 2) and person 2 gets -5 (-4 from person 1, -1 from person 2). 
 
If person 1 chooses B, and person 2 chooses C then person 1 gets –3 (+1 from person 1, 
-4 from person 2) and person 2 gets –2 (-1 from person 1, -1 from person 2). 
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Earning additional money: 
 
In addition to the $15 show-up fee, you will begin the experiment with an additional $5. 
This is the base line, which corresponds to 0 game units. 
 
Based on your decisions in this experiment, units will be added or subtracted from this 
initial amount. At the end of all the interactions, your total monetary payoff will be 
computed to determine the amount of money earned. 
 
If you have a total score of 0 after completing all the interactions, you will have earned 
the additional $5 in the experiment.  
 
If you have a total score above 0, the exchange rate will be 1 unit = $0.10. The 
maximum amount that you can earn will be $25, however, and this is rather unlikely to 
happen.  
 
If you have a total score of less than 0, the exchange rate will be 1 unit = $0.10, such 
that negative units will be withdrawn from the initial $5. However, you cannot lose more 
than the initial $5, so you will always walk away here with at least the $15 show-up fee. 
 
1 unit = $0.10 
 
 